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Introduction 
 
 
Productivity growth was at the heart of the economic development in the Afterwar period 
– the so called ‘trentes glorieuses’. These years were characterised by a strong 
coordination of labour markets, collective agreements that were mainly set at the sectoral 
level and wage constraint. At this time, the most relevant objectives were a strong 
competitive economy, a hard currency, low inflation and full employment. 
It seems that this glorious era has come to an end. Many EU and non-EU countries, such 
as the UK and the USA, have experienced a labour productivity stagnation or slowdown 
over the last decade. Academics, policy makers and business leaders are concerned to 
reverse this trend since “productivity is the ultimate engine of growth in the global 
economy” (OECD 2015). As the working population is projected to decline with the 
ageing population, labour productivity growth becomes the sole source for potential 
average output growth in both the EU and the euro area starting from 2028 (European 
Commission, 2012). This projection includes both the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of growth. 
Directly linked to productivity stagnation is the issue of inequality and, precisely, wage 
inequality (Keune, Tomassetti 2016). There is mounting evidence that “increasing 
inequality may be one of the causes of declining growth, as inequality both impedes 
improvements in productivity and weakens demand. Low growth, in turn, reinforces 
inequality by intensifying distributional conflict” (Streeck 2014, 37). Inequality is also 
likely to increase even more in the years ahead as a consequence of the impact of Industry 
4.0 and the digital evolution of the economy on labour markets and societies (Blasi et al 
2013; Etui 2016). 
On the brink of a new extraordinary age of change – i.e. the so-called Fourth Industrial 
Revolution (Shwab 2016) –, many scholars still disagree over what current technological 
innovations imply for the future of work and employment relations (Katz et al. 2015). 
Along with opportunities, new challenges appear in different forms than previous waves 
of technological change: hybridization between humans and robots; dematerialisation of 
boundaries between industries; working and doing business anytime, anywhere; labour 
market polarisation; marginal cost reduction and productivity slowdown. These factors 
are compounded by an increasingly diverse workforce where tensions exists between 
inclusion and diversity, impacting on employment relations. 
There is consensus that investments in technological innovation, research and skills are 
key drivers for labour productivity. It is also clear that – beside these factors – work 
organisation plays an important role in enhancing labour productivity and making growth 
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sustainable. Productivity figures (GDP/GVA per hour worked and GDP/GVA per capita) 
are linked to the output of production and the input of labour. Collective bargaining and 
other aspects of labour and employment relations play a major role in these figures.  
Dialogue on productivity issues is important both in terms of consensual labour-
management cooperation and as a regulator of wages and conditions of work. 
Coordination of collective bargaining has a positive impact on economic performance, 
because it impedes wage competition and enforces companies to increase productivity in 
order to being able to pay the given wages. At the company level, productivity agreements 
can result in innovation and enhance performance through compensation and benefits, 
working time flexibility, Work-life Balance, skills improvements and workers 
involvement. Furthermore, collective bargaining, especially firm-level bargaining, has 
always been conceived as a means both to facilitate and react to technological changes. 
This project is set against a background of institutionalist research which investigates the 
role of central institutions and actors in the setting and maintenance of employment 
relations. Drawing on key theories such as regulatory space, varieties of capitalism, 
regulation theory and coordination theory this research places the productivity bargaining 
in a theoretical arena to understand the role of productivity bargaining and the 
coordination of collective bargaining across key European countries. 
Against this background, this report aims to shed light on the reasons behind labour 
productivity slowdown or weak growth in some countries, by focusing on the role that 
employment relations plays behind such a trend. Our goal is to analyse the potential and 
effective implication of collective bargaining and employment relations on labour 
productivity, as well as to analyse public policies and social partners’ attitude towards 
labour productivity in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK  
A note of caution is, however, needed because the relationship between employment 
relations and the input of labour is at best complex and, if worse, dubious. While the 
connotation of high productivity and hard work is a very basic one, the actual relationship 
is likely to be much more complex with influence from smarter working, new technology 
and research and development investment. Therefore, when comparing figures of 
productivity GDP growth between countries and sectors, such complexities should be 
kept in mind. The ‘productivity paradox’ furthermore points to the question to what extent 
productivity growth gives an accurate figure of productivity as such. The quality of 
production output may not be taken into account accurately and services that are for free, 
like some of the services with ICT, do not count to productivity but may still add to 
prosperity. 
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Section 1. 
Methodology 
 
 
Cross national comparisons are inherent in social science research and have played a 
central role in the development of the social sciences. Embracing this tradition, this report 
used cross national case study comparisons to determine the role and effectiveness of 
productivity bargaining in the following countries: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, the UK. We selected these countries since they correspond to different 
models of capitalism, industrial relations systems and models of labour market regulation. 
The following table summarises these characteristics, which are explained in depth in the 
theoretical framework section. 
 
Table 1: Country characteristics 
 
 
Bargaining 
coverage (*) 
Bargaining 
coordination 
(1-5 scale) (*) 
Union 
density 
(*) 
Employer 
density (*) 
Variety of 
Capitalism 
(**) 
Model of 
regulation (***) 
Germany 57.6 4 17.1 58.0 CME Meso-
corporatist 
Italy 80.0 3 37.3 56.0 MME Meso-
corporatist 
Netherlands 84.8 4 18 85.0 CME Meso-
corporatist 
Spain 79.8 3 16.8 75.0 MME Meso-
corporatist 
Poland 10 1 12.7 20 LME Market oriented 
UK 29.5 1 25.7 35.0 LME Market oriented 
 
Source: (*) ICTWSS 2016; (**) Hall, Soskice 2001, and Molina, Rhodes 2007; (***) Boyer 2005 
 
Our unit of analysis focuses on four sectors; automotive, healthcare, retail and hospitality. 
These sectors were chosen as each sector reflects differing characteristics; the automotive 
sector is mid skilled, mixed capital and labour intensive. Tourism and retail are low 
skilled and labour intensive, while healthcare is mid skilled and labour intensive. Using 
both the country and sector as the unit of analysis, in each country a team of national 
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researchers undertook semi structured in depth interviews with social partners in each 
sector. The interview covered topics such as the nature and role of productivity 
bargaining, the role of the state in collective bargaining arrangements and perceptions of 
productivity bargaining. To facilitate triangulation, where two or more research strategies 
are used to investigate the same phenomena, interview findings were supported by 
content analysis. Content analysis was conducted on sectoral level collective agreements 
where they existed.  
After national level data collection was carried out the findings from the six countries 
were compared along pre-set themes of pay and reward, inclusion and diversity, voice 
and participation and work organisation and skilling. Comparisons across countries and 
sectors were collated and related back to theory outlined earlier in the report. 
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Section 2. 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In order to understand differing employment relations systems and outcomes we draw on 
a variety of theories to explore national differences. Firstly, we examine varieties of 
capitalism, regulation theory, regulatory space, and coordination theory. These theories 
draw on an institutional approach to uncover the varying role of the state and other 
important institutions in the regulation of employment relations. In addition, we look at 
theories concerned with procedures, contents, approaches and purposes of labour 
regulation, with a focus on collective bargaining regulation.  
The seminal work by Hall and Soskice (2001) explored a typology of capitalism called 
varieties of capitalism (VoC). VoC helps explore the relationships between different 
actors in terms of wage setting/ bargaining, training, corporate governance and employee 
participants (Thelen 2001). VoC states that capitalist economies in the developed world 
can be categorised into two categories depending on the type of institutions and processes 
used to govern co-ordination between firms and other actors (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are dominated by coordination through market 
mechanisms and competition, where there is comparative strength in inventing new 
products (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schröder and Voelzkow, 2016). In contrast, 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) focus on the role of formal institutions to govern 
relationships between actors, collaboration and deliberative firm action (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Kang 2006; Umney 2014). Molina and Rhodes (2007) further classified Spain and 
Italy as mixed market economies (MMEs), identifying the following characteristics: 
employer fragmentation, union political divisions, class conflicts as barriers to reform 
and geographical differences. Despite some value in the VoC typology it has been 
criticized widely for being too reductionist, static, placing too much focus on the firm at 
the expense of the state and neglecting regional variation (Hancké et al. 2007; Kang 2006; 
Schröder and Voelzkow, 2016). It could be stated, therefore, that the value in VoC for 
this project rests on its ability to organize national regimes rather than provide 
explanatory factors. 
Following the VoCs approach, Thelen (2014) has identified a taxonomy of liberalisation 
processes, by relating them to the degree of their social solidarity and egalitarian 
outcomes. In doing so, she contributed to disentangle the broad relationship between 
coordinated and egalitarian models of capitalism, by identifying three different ideal-
typical trajectories of change: through deregulation (low coordination and low coverage), 
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through dualisation (high coordination and low coverage) and through socially embedded 
flexibilisation (low coordination and high coverage).  
A second approach to understanding and theorizing national differences is regulation 
theory. Regulation is understood to be “a governmental activity, exercised by national 
institutions or other bodies including corporation, trade unions, self-regulators, 
professionals, trade bodies or voluntary organisations” (Inversi et al. 2017, 292). 
Regulation theory, as proposed by Boyer (2005) focuses on four categories which have 
different forms of regulation: market-orientated (for example GB), meso-corporatist (for 
example Germany), statist (for example France) and social democratic (for example 
Sweden). Market orientated economies purport individualism and decentralization that 
shape employment and wage formation. In contrast, in state led economies there is strong 
tradition of institutionalization of rules around firing, hiring and wages (Boyer 2005). As 
the name suggests, the statist category has the state at the heart of its macroeconomic 
adjustments. Social democratic countries are small open economies with expert led 
growth regimes and competition that comes from high levels of education among the 
population (Boyer, 2005). However, Boyer’s (2005) regulation theory focuses largely on 
co-ordination by formal institutions, which leaves less room for investigation into the 
power relationship between institutions and the variety in modes of regulation. 
In addition to theories which focus on national typologies, there has been a call in the 
literature for a more nuanced approach to understanding regulation. Schröder and 
Veolzkow (2016) for example, exhort the advantages of looking at three different levels 
of regulation; national, regional and sectoral. According to Schröder and Veolzkow 
(2016) attention should be paid to regions due to a lack of national homogeneity (see also 
Boyer, 2005). Regional variation exists, for example, in Silicon Valley in the US and in 
the three distinctive regions in Italy with their own mode of governance. The key 
challenge in examining regulation at national, regional and sectoral level is integrating 
these three dimensions into a coherent whole. Indeed, Schröder and Veolzkow (2016) 
report that local economies conform to national regulation until sectoral needs prompt 
them to deviate. 
While extant debate focuses on regulation and deregulation, there is scope for responsive 
regulation, which is a pathway between regulation and deregulation (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992; Parker 2013). Expanding the role of non-state actors in the regulation 
puzzle prompts a way forward for understanding complex employment relations. Indeed, 
Dickens (1999) advocates strengthening of implementation of regulation through the 
tripod of employers, legal and social regulation. This is particularly important given the 
weakening or withdrawal of state regulatory institutions (Grabosky 2013). In this 
environment there is a role for state and non-state actors working in tandem (Dickens 
1999; Grabosky 2013; Inversi et al. 2017; Vogel 2010).  
A third framework to understand the process of regulation is the institutionalist 
conception of regulatory space. Inversi et al. (2017) believe the adoption of a regulatory 
space perspective allows for greater attention to be paid to the relationship between labour 
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law and self-regulation with a clear focus on power relationships and actor dynamics. To 
understand the role of regulatory space it is important to look at historical and contextual 
factors which shape and reshape interactions between actors (MacKenzie and Lucio, 
2014). Inversi et al. (2017) propose four levels and dimensions to understand the 
interaction of actors in the regulatory space; law, mandated negation/codetermination, 
voluntarist regulation and unilateralism. This approach encourages a focus on the 
distribution of power between actors instead of a focus on the absence or presence of 
rules. 
Another theoretical framework to understand similarities and differences in collective 
bargaining systems refers to bargaining coordination. Centralisation vs. decentralisation 
in collective bargaining has always been an issue of considerable concern for industrial 
relations scholars (Treu 1985), especially in multi-employer bargaining systems. In 1995 
a seminal publication by Franz Traxler shifted the discussion from the quantitative to the 
qualitative dimension of decentralisation of collective bargaining, by introducing the 
concept of organised (vs. disorganised) decentralisation (Traxler 1995). This gave a 
sociological relevance to two complementary aspects already debated in the legal field: 
conflict between collective agreements at different levels (Aliprantis 1985), especially in 
contexts without legislative intervention in industrial relations affairs (Kahn-Freund, 
1954; Flanders 1974); coordination/articulation of collective bargaining structure (Giugni 
1969). 
In the following years, the notion of (dis)organised decentralisation was integrated with 
the one of collective bargaining governability. Governability of collective bargaining 
refers to the combination between the statutory provisions for the legal enforceability of 
collective agreements and the peace obligation during their validity (Traxler, Kittel, 
2000). Deeply rooted in sociological and legal theory, the discourse on collective 
bargaining governability became central also in the debate on the effects of collective 
bargaining structure on economic performances: irrespective of the degree of 
(de)centralisation, which was central in the corporatist and neo-corporatist theories of 
collective bargaining structure (Aidt, Tzannatos 2008), the empirical evidence showed 
that best economic performances are associated with high collective bargaining 
governability (Traxler, Brandl 2009; Traxler 2003). 
Coordination between bargaining levels is nowadays widely accepted to be crucial in 
guaranteeing the effectiveness of collective bargaining outcomes. Differently, 
disarticulation between bargaining levels undermines the capacity of social partners to 
play a self-regulatory role and therefore to make the economic and normative policies 
they agree effective. Coordinated bargaining, indeed, acts as means of governance by 
preventing the distinct bargaining units of, either the trade unions and the employers, 
from being played off against one another (Pulignano 2010). For labour, this means to 
contain the risk that competition in the labour market prompts employees to undercut 
existing collective agreements and thus to unleash a ‘race to the bottom’. Conversely, for 
employers, bargaining coordination aims at protecting them from ‘whipsawing’ union 
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tactics aimed at confronting the employers individually or group by group (Pulignano 
2010). To a certain extent, disarticulation of bargaining levels reduces the firm interest to 
stay in multi-employer bargaining.  
Turning to theories on contents, approaches and aims of labour regulation, we consider 
John Budd’s conceptualisation (Budd 2004) of employment relations aimed at finding a 
balance between the three dimensions of efficiency (i.e. economic objectives of 
companies), equity (i.e. fair and just treatment of workers) and voice (i.e. employees’ 
involvement). Budd argues that employment should be productive, but it is not simply an 
economic transaction. Employees deserve fair treatment (equity) and input into decision-
making (voice). Efficiency, equity, and voice are therefore the key analytical dimensions 
of the employment relationship. Achievement of economic prosperity, respect for human 
dignity, and equal appreciation for the competing human rights of property rights and 
labour rights further require that efficiency, equity, and voice be balanced. Public policies, 
business practices, and union strategies need to promote this balance and create 
employment relations with a human face. 
The issue of collective bargaining as a lever for sustainability, i.e. a combination between 
efficiency, equality and voice, points us also to look at the role that it can play in both 
facilitating and ameliorating the impact of technology. This conception has been mainly 
fuelled by Dunlop’s theory about technology as a major force that shapes the labour 
relations environment (Dunlop 1958). In 1963 Mancini described the early developments 
of firm-level bargaining in Italy as a process aimed at “distributing in an equal manner 
the benefits of technological progress” (Mancini 1963, 570). In a similar vein, Taylor 
argued that collective bargaining is “the best method to determine the employees’ share 
of the benefits of mechanisation, to ameliorate the impact of employee displacement, and 
to promulgate rules governing the manning and operation of equipment” (Taylor 1962, 
868). Fryer further observed that “collective bargaining legitimately has a very important 
role to play in finding and implementing meaningful adjustments to counteract the 
unpleasant employment effects associated with the introduction of automation and 
technological change” (Fryer 1967, 418). 
About the negotiation of order approach, it is important to emphasise the contents of the 
theory of labour negotiations, elaborated by Walton and McKersie (Walton, McKersie 
1965). They observe the dynamics in collective bargaining and come to identify four sub-
processes: distributive bargaining, involving the distribution of scarce resources, based 
on power relations and associated with a “zero-sum” game; integrative bargaining, 
characterised by a problem-solving approach deriving from the acknowledgement of 
mutual interests, and associated with a “win-win” solution; attitudinal structuring, aimed 
at influencing the attitude and position of the counterpart, e.g. via establishing trust and 
willingness to cooperate; and intra-organisational bargaining, involving the negotiation 
activities within the negotiating parties in order to harmonise interests and aims between 
representatives and their constituents. 
12 
 
 
 
Section 3. 
Labour productivity trends in Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK 
 
 
In order to place productivity bargaining in its context, this section of the report provides 
an overview of productivity figures in the six named countries Germany, Spain, Italy, 
Poland, Netherlands and UK. Firstly, the graphs depict productivity generally by 
examining GDP per hour worked1. In the second part of this section the report examines 
productivity in four sectors; automotive, retail, hospitality and healthcare. 
Figure 1 depicts the productivity trends in the six countries examined. For most countries 
the period from 2001-2008 saw high growth figures, reflecting a boom resulting from an 
investment in new technology since the late 1970s. All countries examined, except for 
Poland, slowed down in 2008, where all economies were severely hit by the recession. 
Indeed, average productivity among the economies involved has not recovered 
structurally since then. Apart from the economic recession, labour productivity trends in 
the 6 countries show very different paths in the period 1995-2016. Three groups of 
countries can be identified in relation to absolute labour productivity levels:  
1. High-level performers: the Netherlands and Germany;  
2. Mid-level performers: the UK, Italy and Spain;  
3. Low-level performer: Poland. 
This picture changes if one considers labour productivity growth rate. Accordingly, three 
different groups can be identified: 
1. High-level performers: Poland; 
2. Mid-level performers: the Netherlands, Germany and Spain; 
3. Low-level performers: Italy and the UK. 
 
                                                 
1 This OECD indicator measures how efficiently labour input is combined with other factors of production 
and used in the production process. Labour input is defined as total hours worked of all persons engaged in 
production. Labour productivity only partially reflects the productivity of labour in terms of the personal 
capacities of workers or the intensity of their effort. The ratio between the output measure and the labour 
input depends to a large degree on the presence and/or use of other inputs (e.g. capital, intermediate inputs, 
technical, organisational and efficiency change, economies of scale). This indicator is measured in USD 
(constant prices 2010 and PPPs) and indices. 
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Figure 1: Gross domestic product per hour worked (USD, constant prices) 
 
 
 
Source: ADAPT/WERU on OECD 2017 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show two important factors for labour productivity; labour 
compensation2 and working hours. These factors are also the main objectives of collective 
bargaining. Precisely, the relation between gross value added per hour worked and labour 
compensation is a key indicator of competitiveness, but also an indicator of sustainability, 
depending on the size of the gap between productivity and wages. Three groups of 
countries can be identified: 
1. Productivity is higher than wages: Germany, the Netherlands, Poland. Among 
these countries there are two groups one which is performing better in absolute 
terms (Germany and the Netherlands) and a second group which is performing 
better in relative (Poland) terms. Additionally, two other groups of countries can 
be further identified: 
a. Low gap between productivity and wage levels (sustainable): Germany, 
the Netherlands; 
b. High gap between productivity and wage levels (unsustainable): Poland. 
2. Counter-cyclical relation between productivity and wages: Italy and Spain; 
3. Wages are higher than productivity: the UK. 
 
                                                 
2 Labour compensation per hour worked is defined by the OECD as compensation of employees in national 
currency divided by total hours worked by employees. Compensation of employees is the sum of gross 
wages and salaries and employers’ social security contributions. This indicator is measured in terms of 
annual growth rates and indices. 
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Figure 2: Gross value added (GVA) per hour worked and labour compensation per hour worked in 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the UK (1995=100) 
 
 
 
Source: ADAPT on OECD 2017 
 
 
The graph below illustrates the average annual hours actually worked per worker in the 
six countries compared3. As this indicator compounds the labour productivity indicator 
(gross domestic product per hour worked), it comes with no surprise that countries where 
hours worked are lower, are those performing better in terms of labour productivity. 
However, as for the relation between productivity and wages, working hours are also an 
indicator of both efficiency and sustainability of the systems. In this respect, three groups 
of countries can be identified: 
1. High sustainability (lower working hours): Germany and the Netherlands; 
2. Mid sustainability (relatively low levels of performances coupled with relatively 
high working hours): Italy, Spain, the UK; 
3. Low sustainability (low levels of performances coupled with high working hours): 
Poland. 
                                                 
3 This OECD indicator is defined as the total number of hours actually worked per year divided by the 
average number of people in employment per year. Actual hours worked include regular work hours of 
full-time, part-time and seasonal? workers, paid and unpaid overtime, hours worked in additional jobs, and 
exclude time not worked because of public holidays, annual paid leave, own illness, injury and temporary 
disability, maternity leave, parental leave, schooling or training, slack work for technical or economic 
reasons, strike or labour dispute, bad weather, compensation leave and other reasons. The data cover 
employees and self-employed workers. The data are published with the following caution: The data are 
intended for comparisons of trends over time; they are unsuitable for comparisons of the level of average 
annual hours of work for a given year, because of differences in their sources and method of calculation. 
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Figure 3: Average annual hours actually worked per worker 
 
 
 
Source: ADAPT/WERU on OECD 2017 
 
Turning to sectoral developments of labour productivity, in figure 4 we can see that the 
recession in 2008 had a large impact on the automotive industry in all six countries. The 
Netherlands took the largest hit in the 2008-2009 period. Since the recession automotive 
productivity has increased to above recession levels in all six countries. Overall, general 
trends of labour productivity (Figure 1) tend to reflect manufacturing productivity, which 
is the segment of the economy where added value is among the highest levels. Hence, in 
the automotive industry we can still distinguish the three groups of countries identified 
for the overall economy: 
1. High-level performers: the Netherlands and Germany;  
2. Mid-level performers: the UK, Italy and Spain;  
3. Low-level performer: Poland. 
It is hard to pinpoint the actual explanation for such national differences. The sector is 
first of all very globalised and productivity is the most crucial factor for the global 
competition in this sector. The older EU member states – including the UK – are 
characterised by high levels of productivity as the outcome of high commitment to cost 
reduction combined with innovation strongly focused on quality improvement. While 
Germany still shows high levels of productivity growth – even after the Diesel scandal 
which hit particularly Volkswagen very badly – the other countries are driven by the same 
dynamic of productivity growth. Poland attracted a lot of investment as it’s economy 
transition. This investment may lag behind in terms of productivity in the near future with 
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the consolidation of investment in technology and human capital in terms of improvement 
of efficiency in work organisation 
Things change significantly if we look at labour productivity outside automotive 
manufacturing. Gross value added in healthcare, tourism and retail is significantly lower 
than productivity in the automotive industry. Compared to trends in the overall economy, 
sectoral differences emerge along with countries productivity performances. Such 
differences are inevitably influenced by the sectoral composition of the six economies. 
The only similarity that combines trends across sectors and between sectors and the 
overall economy is labour productivity trend in Poland: all the graphs below show that 
this country registers the weakest performance in absolute terms and is among the best 
performers in relative terms. This trend in Poland can be attributed to the growth spurt 
experienced as the markets became liberalised after the fall of Communism. 
 
Figure 4: Gross value added per thousand hour worked in the automotive industry (manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and of other transport equipment) 
 
 
 
Source: ADAPT/WERU on Eurostat (2017) 
 
The graph below illustrates productivity in the healthcare sector in the six countries. 
Germany shows a shallow growth curve compared to the Netherlands which shows 
steeper increases 2000-2005 and 2007-2009. Polish healthcare productivity showed a 
sharp decrease in the recession years, similar to the UK. In contrast, Italy and Spain 
showed no reduction in productivity as a result of the recession. Comparison in healthcare 
across countries is complex due to the differences in the distribution of public and private 
sector roles in healthcare in different countries. Factors that may explain parts of this 
trend are problems with the public sector deficit, the policy within various countries 
regarding healthcare and the way in which and the level to which austerity hit the sector.  
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Figure 5: Gross value added per thousand hour worked in the healthcare sector (human health activities) 
 
 
 
Source: ADAPT/WERU on Eurostat 2017 
 
Figure 6 below shows productivity in the hospitality sector in the six countries. From this 
graph we can see that the sharpest decline was seen in the UK in 2007-2009 in line with 
the recession. This sharp decline in the UK could be attributed to the UK’s large service 
economy. Poland also saw a sharp decline in the recession and has grown steadily since. 
In contrast to this trend, Spain has seen shallower growth, as seen also in Italy and the 
Netherlands. Spain is experiencing a more recent decline in productivity between 2012-
2015 reflecting the mass tourism problems experienced by Spain in this period. 
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Figure 6: Gross value added per thousand hour worked in the tourism sector (accommodation and food 
service activities) 
 
 
 
Source: ADAPT/WERU on Eurostat 2017 
 
Figure 7 depicts retail productivity showing high levels of productivity in the UK, again 
reflecting the dominance of the service economy in the UK. Higher investment in logistics 
in the UK may reflect this growth in the retail sector in the UK. In addition, higher levels 
of consumption – partly based on private and public debts is a factor contributing to 
higher turnover and related productivity growth. The recession impacted retail 
productivity in all countries except Spain, which saw an increase in productivity 2007-
2010. Poland showed a sharp recovery period up to 2013 with productivity decreasing in 
2014. The UK has steeper growth in retail productivity from 2009 in contrast to the 
shallower growth of the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Germany.  
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Figure 7: Gross value added per thousand persons employed in the retail sector 
 
 
 
Source: ADAPT/WERU on Eurostat 2017 
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Section 4. 
Comparative analysis of similarities and differences in 
collective bargaining and labour productivity in Germany, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK 
 
 
Two out of the six countries compared – Poland and the UK – can be placed among the 
so-called liberal market economies (VoC typology) and the market-oriented model of 
labour regulation (Boyer, 2005). Both countries fit within the deregulatory model of 
liberalisation elaborated by Thelen (2014), which is characterised by intentional political 
dismantling of coordinating capacity and low coverage. In line with our theoretical 
framework, the analysis shows that these country models purport individualism and 
decentralization that shape employment and wage formation irrespective of, and in the 
absence of, any form of coordination. Moreover, they tend to be associated with 
voluntarist regulation and unilateralism. In terms of contents and effects of labour 
regulation, lack of coordination and weak industrial relations institutions tend to result in 
an unbalanced combination of efficiency, equity and voice in labour-management 
relations and employment regulation (Budd 2004). In these countries efficiency concerns 
dominate both equity and voice. Yet such an imbalance seems to be unsustainable in the 
long-run: the UK case, for example, is proving to be unable to achieve or maintain high 
productivity levels. Therefore, collective bargaining in these countries has the potential 
to be means for labour and management to find a more sustainable balance between 
economic objectives and fair and just treatment of workers. Moreover, multi-employer 
bargaining structures and higher wages could push companies to invest in innovation and 
take the high-road to productivity. In these countries, however, the absence of a 
supportive legal framework hinders the ability for true collective bargaining to take place. 
In the absence of a coordinated approach to labour regulation there is a high level of 
reliance on Human Resource Management and individualistic firm level processes.  
A second group of countries – Italy and Spain – identifies the so called mixed market 
economies (Molina, Rhodes 2007). Our analysis confirms that these countries are 
characterised by relatively strong labour market institutions and a meso-corporatist form 
of labour regulation (Boyer 2005), which takes place at different levels, including 
statutory legislation, multi-employer agreements at national, industry and regional levels, 
firm-level bargaining and Human Resource Management. Despite their ability to 
coordinate wage and labour standards horizontally, these countries are also characterised 
by weak vertical coordination and integration between what is agreed at central level and 
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what is practiced in the periphery (Molina, Rhodes 2007). Bargaining governability 
(Traxler 2003) is relatively weak due to informality of labour-management relations and 
localism, especially when it comes to smaller firms in which unilateralism tends to prevail 
as no obligation to set up works councils applies nor collective bargaining takes place. 
This might result in lack of national homogeneity, dualism and free-riding in the labour 
market. Finally, confrontational industrial relations tend to prevail, thus resulting in less 
integrative bargaining outcomes (Walton, McKersie 1965), which tend to reflect more 
power-based rather than trust-based relationships. It comes with no surprise that national 
or sector-wide regulations based on a sustainable compromise between efficiency and 
equity do not necessarily translate into sustainable HRM or industrial relations practices 
at a firm-level, or that high and low roads to productivity coexist across sectors and 
companies.  
Two out of the six countries compared – Germany and the Netherlands – can be placed 
among the so-called traditional coordinated market economies (VoC typology) and the 
meso-corporatist models of labour regulation (Boyer 2005). These systems are 
characterised by relatively strong industrial relations institutions and large capacity for 
coordination between and within sectors. Cooperative industrial relations at both sectoral 
and firm levels tend to reflect into integrative bargaining (Walton, McKersie 1965) and 
sustainable compromise between efficiency, equity and voice (Budd 2004). These 
countries, however, are facing many challenges and coordination between industries is 
much weaker today than it has been twenty years ago. Both countries seem to have 
followed the path of liberalisation through dualisation (Thelen 2007). Wage coordination 
still works, but it works only for some industries and for a shrinking share of employees, 
and the interaction between coordinated and uncoordinated areas undermines the former 
in favour of the latter. This trend has been fuelled by the spread of outsourcing and 
atypical forms of employment, especially in the weaker performing service sectors, that 
has contributed to the growth of a low wage sector within the service industries. 
Moreover, also the coverage of collective bargaining has decreased significantly.  
 
 
1. National Peculiarities and Sectoral Influences 
  
Poland 
 
In contrast to the high level of productivity in most economies during pre-crisis years, 
Poland had the lowest level of productivity of the six countries. Despite Poland’s initial 
low levels of productivity, Poland now shows the highest level of productivity. This boom 
can be attributed to the effect of the economy catching up after the collapse of the 
Communist regime in 1989. The economy went through a shock therapy where 
liberalisation of the market was the most dominant form of market reform. Poland 
attracted investment from Western European economies competing on low wage levels 
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and a growing investment in education. The investment was accompanied by a more 
intensive use of technology and transfer of technology to the Polish economy, in 
particular manufacturing. Despite positive productivity growth-rate, in Section 3 we 
showed that Polish labour productivity is comparatively lower than productivity in the 
other countries. Low-road to labour productivity (wage moderation) associated with 
catch-up effect following deep structural reforms that transformed the country in an open, 
free market economy might be an explanation for this evidence. In other words, the 
growth model underpinning Poland’s success heavily relies on low-to-medium 
technology sectors with a relatively high share of low-skilled labour. Unilateralism is the 
dominant form of managing workers in the country, as industrial relations institutions are 
weak and collective bargaining is almost non-existent as a source of labour market 
regulation. This situation results in unbalanced efficiency-oriented regulation and HRM 
practices. However, this trend is expected to be unsustainable in the long run as the catch-
up effect will dissolve and innovation, social cohesion, and equality will emerge as 
fundamental requisite for sustainable growth. Poland’s economic success has been 
impressive but its past record does not guarantee the same level of economic expansion 
in the future. In this position, the new government is trying to shift to a high-road model 
for growth to better combine economic prosperity with fair and just treatment of workers.  
 
The UK 
 
The UK economy suffered deeply, partly because of the contribution of financial services 
to the overall economy and the debt risks involved. The LSE Growth Commission (2017), 
when addressing the low productivity in the UK, points to four areas that would need 
attention from the government: jobs and skills, industrial strategy, openness and finance 
and growth. According to this Commission the tax system favours self-employment over 
employee status. Boosting skills and wages could lead towards more inclusive growth as 
highlighted earlier in this report. The productivity puzzle may be explained by two majors 
aspects of the new economy: an over reliance on marginalised, unsustainable jobs and an 
increase of ICT which may not be reflected in the productivity figures as services are not 
materialised in productivity figures. Low-road to labour productivity and disconnected 
capitalism characterise the UK story since the onset of Thatcherism and are possible 
explanation for slow but constant labour productivity erosion over the last two decades. 
This situation worsened in parallel to the growth in low-paid and low-skilled jobs in the 
wake of the financial crisis. When it comes to labour and employment relations, 
unilateralism tends to prevail over coordination and collaborative decision making at both 
a central and decentralised level. In this perspective, the UK case compares well with the 
Polish one as it (already) shows that good productivity performances are unsustainable if 
they are not coupled with high-road policies to labour productivity. A decentralised 
liberal collective bargaining structure has led to workplaces with weak unions and a 
management preoccupation with lowering unit costs. Healthcare stands apart with its 
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multi-union, national terms and conditions. Yet despite this more European model of 
collective bargaining, the sector still experiences lack of investment in skills, 
preoccupation with unit cost and scant attention to inclusion and diversity. There is a need 
for a coordinated industrial policy, supported by legislation in order to move the UK to a 
more coordinated structure where meaningful collective bargaining can thrive and 
outstrip the financialisation agenda. 
 
Italy 
 
Italy has experienced a labour productivity stagnation since mid-1990s. Prior to the 
recession in 2008 Italy showed the strongest level of productivity in 2001. Various factors 
are responsible for the low productivity figures. One major factor is the low level of skills, 
reflected in the low participation with tertiary level education and the relative high 
numbers of inhabitants with only a primary education. Another factor is the lack of 
investment in research and development and related investment in innovation and skills. 
Other problems adding to this situation are monetary instability and overspending by the 
Government. Alongside these with multiple factors that have influenced negative trends 
in labour productivity, the model of multi-employer bargaining plays an important role. 
The compromise behind the so-called Giugni Protocol of 1993 was that, in addition to 
national sectoral collective agreements (NCLAs), decentralised bargaining should have 
linked pay rises to productivity, in order to complement low wages fixed at central level. 
Firm-level collective bargaining, however, is still scarce, covering a minor part of 
companies and employees. No redistribution of profits through decentralised bargaining 
coupled with relatively low wages in NCLAs allowed marginal companies to remain 
competitive, without investing in innovation, skills and R&D, i.e. the key drivers of 
productivity. Indeed, the fact that economy-wide agreements state that productivity 
should not be distributed to workers through NCLAs but only through company-level 
bargaining, only makes sense if the coverage of company (or decentralized) bargaining 
approximates 100% of workers. If coverage is below 100%, such wage coordination rule 
implies that productivity increases will not be redistributed, but will increase the share of 
profits in GDP with the following risks: domestic demand stagnates; financial speculation 
increases (profits are less likely to be consumed than saved); and inequality increases too. 
For this reason both Governments and social partners are trying to promote the diffusion 
of decentralised collective bargaining. In terms of contents, in all sectors, working 
conditions in NCLAs are the result of a well-balanced compromise between efficiency, 
equity and voice. The high-road to labour productivity tends to prevail, despite the fact 
that wages are generally lower than the EU average. Such sustainable compromise, 
however, is jeopardised by the so-called “pirate contracts”, i.e. alternative NCLAs signed 
by non-representative trade unions and employers’ associations with the aim to cut labour 
standards and costs. At a firm level, collective bargaining seems to be polarised between 
best practice (high-road to productivity), and worst practices (low-road to productivity). 
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In many marginal companies, especially SMEs, firm-level collective bargaining does not 
exist at all, and/or NCLAs are applied in “flexible” ways. This means that, irrespective 
of contents of collective bargaining at all levels, there is a problem of collective 
bargaining governability and effectiveness. 
 
Spain 
 
Spanish productivity was fairly flat 2001-2008 and has shown signs of recovery post-
recession. The Spanish economy suffered most severely from the financial crisis in 2008. 
Part of the problem was the role of housing and construction which went through a long 
period of unprecedented growth with the boom of tourism. Banks were lending and 
overspending, which made the economic activities in housing and building hazardous and 
banks had to be bailed out when the financial crisis occurred. The effect of this bail out 
was high public expenditure and an increase in national debt. In the labour market this 
situation had an overall effect on high unemployment figures and a lack of adjustment to 
the new economic situation where the strong lack of demand made problems even worse. 
Spain exhibits a strong counter-cyclical character in productivity developments. This 
means that employers in Spain rely on temporary employment as a mechanism to adjust 
to changes in the economic context. In times of economic growth, the Spanish labour 
market creates many poor quality jobs (temporary and low paid) that are then destroyed 
when the economy enters a recession. The increase in productivity observed since 2008 
is however due to a very rapid increase in unemployment, not to a more efficient use of 
labour. The problems related to low productivity, indeed, remain largely in the post-crisis 
period. In the labour market there is a variety of factors responsible for low productivity 
of which the most important are the reliance on low cost labour and the use of temporary 
contracts as a way to increase flexibility in a market dominated by rigidities. The relative 
high increase of productivity levels can be largely contributed to the use of these types of 
labour contracts under conditions of cheap, predominantly low skilled labour. There are 
signs, nevertheless, of productivity increases with a change of labour market policies, 
including active labour market policies, and an improvement in export figures. 
 
Germany 
 
The overall trend of labour productivity growth in Germany since the 1990s is positive. 
The German economy is often considered a core economy in the EU, showing a trade 
surplus connected with a strong manufacturing sector. Traditionally the labour market is 
characterised by diversified quality production (Streeck 1992), with a high level of 
involvement of social partners with policy making and involvement of employee 
representatives at company level. This approach is not only the basis for a high level of 
skilling and security for employees, but also a high degree of flexibility and investment 
in technological innovation. The steady growth of productivity is particularly due to the 
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wage moderation with the Harz reform. In some respects this reform may pose a problem 
on the demand side of the economy while the economy prospers from a trade surplus 
creating some imbalance in the international trade relations. The growth rate of labour 
productivity, however, is eroding in parallel with the erosion of the traditional country 
model of capitalism and industrial relations system. Germany has long been regarded as 
an outstanding example of a coordinated market economy that combines high 
international competitiveness in the manufacturing sector with high wages and a – 
relatively – equal distribution of income. On this basis, it was said that the German 
economy specializes in customized and high quality products, making use of well-trained 
employees with broad skills and high job tenure in the companies. Industry level wage 
coordination is a central mechanism because it impedes wage competition between 
companies and sectors within the economy, it gives incentives to make use of the skills 
of the employees and it enforces the companies to modernize and to increase productivity 
in line with the wage increases. Coordination between industries, however, is much 
weaker today than it was twenty years ago. The logic of pattern bargaining between the 
sectors has been largely eroded and wage development in the manufacturing and many 
of the service industries is decoupled. The growing labour volume especially in the 
service sectors went hand in hand with a structural shift of the sectoral composition of the 
economy in favour of the weaker performing service sectors, where the less skilled 
segment of workers are employed, non-standard types of work prevail, coverage of 
collective bargaining declines and trade unions’ power is limited. Against this 
background, despite both sectoral and firm-level bargaining, is the result of a good 
compromise between efficiency, equity and voice, labour productivity as a justification 
of wage demands and as a basis of a productivity compromise in collective bargaining 
remains important only in the automotive sector. In the other sectors analysed the 
collective bargaining actors do not refer to the development of productivity in collective 
bargaining and unions are no longer able to copy bargaining developments in the 
manufacturing industry.  
 
The Netherlands 
 
When comparing productivity growth figures the most striking change took place in the 
Dutch economy in the beginning of the 1990s. While the labour market was most severely 
impacted by the low participation rate and high levels of disablement and unemployment, 
there were some changes that counted for the higher levels of productivity. After the 
Wassenaar agreement, aiming to improve profits and lower the numbers of working hours 
with a moderation of wages, there was an increasing level of flexibility and an increase 
of labour with part-time jobs. This situation led to the Netherlands being included as a 
European Tiger (with Ireland and Denmark). Since then the economy went through a 
period of stable development with a relative high level of productivity. Flexibility in the 
labour market is still an aspect which has both positive and negative outcomes. The open 
BARGAINING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 
26 
economy prospers from such flexibility while it may pose a problem for the future 
generation. The gig economy, in particular, threatens a sustainable working life, which 
will also impact the levels of demand in the economy. The relatively good performance 
of the Netherlands in the period 1995-2005 is related to the internationally acclaimed 
success of the so-called Polder model. The Dutch economy weathered the international 
downturn of the mid-1990s better than most other (old) EU member states. At that time, 
this success was attributed to the Dutch system of consensus seeking by the government 
and the social partners, which resulted in a prolonged period of wage moderation, a 
relatively low unemployment rate, reform of the welfare state (in particular, disability 
benefits) and reduction of the budget deficit. Moreover, in a European comparative 
perspective, the Dutch system of industrial relations is characterized as having a strong 
system of worker participation at the company level, especially in terms of formal rights 
and positions in strategic organizational issues. In this respect, works councils are mostly 
argued to be effective in improving productivity or decreasing labour turnover. These 
positive effects disappeared with the credit crunch of 2008 and the ensuing economic 
crisis. Since the onset of the economic crisis, many companies started to follow a low-
road to productivity, by trying to improve their competitiveness and to increase their 
profits by reducing labour costs through hiring employees on flexible contracts (such as 
fixed-term contracts, agency work and on-call contracts) and awarding contracts to self-
employed workers. This strategy, however, amounts to increasing the labour intensity of 
production, hence reducing productivity growth, instead of capital deepening, which 
would boost productivity growth in a more sustainable manner. 
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Section 5. 
Public policies and social partners’ attitude towards labour 
productivity in Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain and the UK 
 
 
1. Public policies on labour productivity and their (in)effectiveness 
 
The United Kingdom, albeit historically, and Italy stand out as the only countries where 
public policies have directly targeted collective bargaining as a means to foster labour 
productivity. From late-1960s until early-1980s, the UK Government considered the 
scant performance of productivity as dependent on the uncoordinated system of two-tier 
collective bargaining, hence attempts to integrate shop-stewards in the collective 
bargaining system and formalise company-level bargaining procedures were promoted 
via legislative measures. With the onset of Thatcherism such policies dissolved: 
Governments promoted unilateralism and labour disempowerment as the prevalent way 
to achieve growth. With the aim to link wages to productivity, since 2009 the Italian 
governments have pursued improvements in firms’ and labour productivity via normative 
and fiscal incentives for variable pay, welfare schemes and flexible work organisation 
resulting from local-level collective agreements. Such fiscal incentives increase if firm-
level agreements provide a system of workers’ participation. In the other countries that 
were compared, we found that collective bargaining itself is not a distinctive goal of 
government policy on productivity, although public policies goals are often concerned 
with bargaining-related issues. In the Netherlands, for example, between the 1950s and 
the 1980s, the government and social partners jointly developed an industrialisation and 
productivity policy, also by promoting productivity enhancing innovations in work 
organisation, mechanisms for wage control, job classification systems and vocational-
education and training initiatives. The German legislation on works councils ensures that 
some of the key decisions at the workplace are not taken by the employer alone but 
involve representatives of the workforce. The works council, however, cannot consider 
only the interests of the employees: its legal basis is to work together with the employer 
in a spirit of mutual trust, for the good of the employees and the establishment. 
Irrespective of collective bargaining strategies, productivity has recently fallen under the 
spotlight of policy makers in the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany due to productivity 
slowdown or stagnation. In these countries, we found that digitalisation (via public 
expenditure in digital and research infrastructure and fiscal incentives for business 
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investments) comes out as a key strategy to foster productivity. In Italy, the government 
has recently passed the so-called Industry 4.0 plan, while German government has 
developed a “digital agenda 2014-2017” and a “platform industry 4.0” to support an 
innovation strategy aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the German economy. In 
UK, the so-called “Fixing the Foundations: creating a more prosperous Britain” plan, 
launched by the Conservative government aimed to introduce fiscal incentives and 
promote investment in digital research infrastructure can be considered as a policy 
directly intended to prompt productivity. In Poland the National Training Fund 
encourages digital innovation and skill development with the aim to impact labour 
productivity indirectly. Moreover, the current Polish government issued a Strategy of 
Responsible Development in early 2017, which set the path towards a more socially 
oriented and sustainable growth agenda. 
As we showed in Section 3, the recent public policies on (labour) productivity has not 
proved to be successful yet. In the United Kingdom, productivity growth is experiencing 
a serious slowdown, while in Poland the slow increase in labour productivity is attributed 
to technological development, the restructuring of ex-nationalised companies and the 
catch-up effect, rather than to government’s interventions. Despite the attempt to 
strengthen the UK’s productivity, industrial policy has been met with criticism. Trade 
unions and professional bodies alike have criticised the policy for lacking infrastructure 
and investment to translate the policy into improved productivity outcomes. The same is 
for Italy: despite a number of companies making use of fiscal incentives for firm-level 
collective bargaining, this has not produced tangible effects in terms of labour 
productivity growth and diffusion of firm-level collective bargaining. It could be 
suggested, therefore, that such policy attempts to support productivity in the UK and Italy 
are unsupported by the necessary systems to translate the policy into practice. Conversely, 
in Germany, public policies on the digital agenda and Industry 4.0, developed in 
cooperation with unions and employers’ organisations, are expected to bring about a 30% 
increase in labour productivity. 
 
Table 2: Policies on labour productivity and their (in)effectiveness 
 
 Public policies Social partners (In)effectiveness 
Germany Not an issue itself 
Industry 4.0 and digital 
agenda 
Historically a greater 
role 
Active industry policy 
Generally effective  
Italy High in governmental 
agenda 
Industry 4.0 
High in social partners’ 
agenda 
Generally ineffective, with 
few exceptions  
Netherlands Historically greater 
attention 
Addressed indirectly 
Historically a greater 
role 
Divide between sectors 
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Poland “New deal” towards 
sustainability 
Not an issue Unknown 
Spain High in governmental 
agenda 
 
High in social partners’ 
agenda 
Divide between big 
companies and SMEs 
UK Historically greater 
attention 
Nowadays, lack of 
coordinated strategies 
Lack of coordinated 
strategies 
Generally ineffective 
 
 
2. Views and Strategies of Social Partners in relation to Labour Productivity 
 
Poland stands out as the only country where productivity is not an explicit concern for 
social partners, although tripartite social dialogue has recently showed more interest in 
productivity-related issues. Conversely, labour productivity is a priority for social 
partners in all the other counties. Given the productivity stagnation and slow-down 
between 1995 and mid-2000s, with the trilateral framework agreement of 2009 and their 
successors Italian social partners started to put labour productivity high on their agenda: 
Government and social partners – with the relevant exception of Confederazione 
Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL, the General Confederation of Italian Workers – 
opened-up a process decentralisation of collective bargaining as a means to make work 
organisation more efficient and to redistribute the expected productivity growth in terms 
of higher wages and investment. German unions are pursuing a strategy aimed at 
combining productivity with decent work, co-determination and training: such high–road 
to productivity coexists with several firms’ attempts to improve productivity via 
derogations to sectoral standards and the use of non-standard work. In the Netherlands, 
in 2005, social partners drafted a policy report called “Towards a more productive 
economy” suggesting that a productive economy can be achieved via flexible working 
hours, performance-related pay, training and cooperative industrial relations. The UK 
national report does not explicitly mention productivity as a priority for social partners, 
even though both employers’ associations and trade unions express their concerns on this 
topic. 
We found that collective bargaining is generally regarded as a driver for productivity by 
Italian, German (with specific regard to the metalworking industry) and Dutch social 
partners, although it is also acknowledged that other factors (e.g. business investments in 
technology, research and development, human capital development) contribute more to 
boosting productivity. Interestingly, in the Netherlands, social partners (in the manifesto 
“Towards new labour relations”) emphasise the concept of “co-creation” (intended as 
integrative bargaining) to the benefit of social innovation and competitiveness; the 
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manifesto is also clear that that “productivity growth should be based on investments in 
workers”. In UK and Poland social partners’ opinions are more polarised between 
employers’ and workers’ representatives. Unite, a large British trade union, is clear that 
social dialogue and collaboration between stakeholders are necessary to solve the UK 
productivity problem, but at the same time employers’ associations do not consider 
information and consultation of employees and overall labour-management relations as 
vehicles for increasing productivity. Also Polish employers’ organisations prefer to tackle 
the issue of labour productivity unilaterally. Plus, in Poland, neither the unions are 
concerned about productivity since they are still dealing with a problem of 
representativeness. 
 
 
3. Whether and How Collective Agreements at Different Levels are Concerned 
with Labour Productivity 
 
Productivity can act as an input for and/or as an output of collective bargaining. We found 
that productivity is an input for collective bargaining only in Germany, and specifically 
in manufacturing sectors, where productivity is still an argument that legitimises unions’ 
wage demands at industry-level. More recently, productivity growth has been included in 
Spanish peak inter-sectoral agreements as a benchmark for negotiated wage increases at 
the different levels of the collective bargaining structure. At the company level, 
productivity is regarded as an input of wage bargaining in Italy and to a lesser extent, in 
Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, as long as pay rises are linked to firms’ or workers’ 
performances.  
With the relevant exceptions of Italy (at both national and company level since the onset 
of the economic crisis) and Germany (particularly in the cases of company-level 
derogations from national collective agreements), productivity is not an explicit goal of 
collective bargaining. Indeed, we found that “productivity bargaining” is rare and, when 
this occurs, tends to be associated to concession bargaining through which investments 
and occupational stability are traded-off with measures to cut labour costs or to make 
work organisation more efficient by putting pressures on workers. Nonetheless, there are 
a number of elements of productivity or efficiency to be found implicitly in different 
collective agreements, both on industry or plant level, ranging from flexible working 
times to performance based pay or profit sharing. Our content analysis shows that 
productivity may be boosted indirectly also via collective agreements on VET initiatives, 
career development, participatory rights for works councils, welfare measures, etc., as in 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, or pursued unilaterally via HRM practices 
and informal individual arrangements as in Poland and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 3 – Collective bargaining and labour productivity 
 
 Productivity as an 
input 
Productivity as an 
explicit output (i.e. 
productivity 
bargaining) 
High-road to 
productivity 
Low-road to 
productivity 
Germany Some NCLAs Rare Widespread in firm-
level agreements 
Some firm-level 
agreements 
Italy Not in NCLAs 
Yes in firm-level 
bargaining 
Rare NCLAs and some 
firm-level 
agreements 
Some “pirate” 
NCLAs in labour 
intensive sectors 
Some firm-level 
agreements in SMEs 
Widespread in 
HRM in SMEs 
Netherlands No Rare More in capital 
intensive sectors 
More in labour 
intensive sectors 
Poland No No Rare, only in some 
companies 
Widespread (HRM) 
Spain Some NCLAs Rare Some firm-level 
agreements (big 
companies) 
More in labour 
intensive sectors 
and in SMEs 
UK No No Rare, only in some 
companies 
Widespread (HRM) 
 
While in Poland and the United Kingdom, social dialogue or collective bargaining over 
labour productivity are uncommon, in Germany, Italy and, to a lesser extent, the 
Netherlands, good practices of collective bargaining have been identified at both industry 
and company level. Overall, bargaining parties in the latter group of countries are engaged 
in an effort to achieve a “sustainable compromise” between employers’ demands for 
productivity and workers’ needs of equity and voice. In terms of content, this approach 
to collective bargaining results in higher wages but flexible; lower working-hours but 
more flexible working-time arrangements; cooperative approach to labour-management 
relations; integrative bargaining; and stronger workers’ participation and trade unions’ 
rights. We found that high-road to productivity can also coexist with bad practices of 
collective bargaining, which result in lower wages but fixed; Higher working-hours but 
fixed; Confrontational approach; Distributive bargaining. High-road to productivity tends 
to be associated with larger companies (e.g. Spain), characterised by capital intensive 
activities and high-skilled workforce (e.g. the Netherlands). Conversely, low-road to 
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productivity tends to be associated to smaller companies (e.g. Spain and Italy), 
characterised by labour intensive activities and low-skilled workforce. 
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Conclusion 
 
Taking an institutional approach this report has examined the role and extent of 
productivity bargaining in four sectors automotive, hospitality, retail and healthcare in six 
key European countries the UK, Italy, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands and Germany. The 
report found that the Varieties of Capitalism thesis served mainly as an organising tool to 
differentiate the countries in contrast to the regulation theory by Boyer (2005) which 
served to explain differences between countries. In particular the report highlights the 
need for responsive regulation where state and non-state actors work in harmony to 
protect and maintain employment relations (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Dickens 1999; 
Grabosky 2013).  
The report finds support for the positive outcomes achieved through coordinated 
bargaining (see Pulignano 2010) and collective bargaining governability (Traxler 2003) 
as seen in Germany and the Netherlands. Multi-employer bargaining and bargaining 
coordination might have a positive impact on economic performance, because in principle 
they impede wage competition and enforces companies to increase productivity in order 
to being able to pay the given wages. Relatively high wage levels and high collective 
bargaining coverage seems, however, to be important requisite to make wage 
coordination able to foster productivity and, at the same time, to make productivity 
bargaining socially embedded (Thelen 2014).  
Most importantly, in multi-employer bargaining systems bargaining governability seems 
to play an important role too (Traxler 2003; Traxler, Kittel 2000). Indeed, it is to consider 
that coordination rules in multi-employer bargaining are not just an instrument for wage 
policy setting (horizontal coordination), but they are also a mechanism through which 
wage policies are enforced and provided with effectiveness (vertical coordination). 
Therefore, if social partners at a national level agree on a specific economic policy 
(horizontal coordination), local actors must comply with it (vertical coordination), 
regardless of the contents that the policy might take. Otherwise coordination fails, the 
normative role of national social partners is undermined and they lose credibility. 
In this connection, state intervention plays an important role to the extent that it mediates 
the effects of collective bargaining and can support or hinder social partners’ policies in 
regulating the labour market. In addition to State promotion of trade unions rights and 
prerogatives at workplace, regulatory spaces where the law influences collective 
bargaining are relevant too (Inversi et al. 2017). If organisational flexibility can be 
implemented only via collective bargaining, collective agreements are more likely to 
result in a good compromise between efficiency, equity and voice. Conversely, if the law 
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allows companies to use flexibility directly, this might result in unbalanced bargaining 
outcomes or HRM practices.  
Overall, contents of collective agreements are generally the result of a compromise 
between efficiency, equity and voice (Budd 2004). Such compromise is fundamental to 
make labour regulation functional to economic interests in a sustainable way. In this 
connection, collective bargaining in liberal market economies can be a means to better 
combine efficiency with equality and decent working conditions, in order to foster a 
sustainable model of growth. On the other hand, in coordinated market economies 
collective bargaining, especially at a firm level, has been used to deregulate and/or re-
regulate working conditions (Inversi et al. 2017). These practices are, however, limited 
and, in any case, they still result in a relatively good compromise between efficiency, 
equity and voice as the alternative would be direct deregulation or deregulation via 
statutory legislation and unilateral managerial measures. In other words, even when 
collective bargaining is explicitly used to productivity/efficiency purposes, it is still a 
driver for a socially embedded model of flexibilisation (Thelen 2014). 
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